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In Kaley v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment2 or
the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel3 entitles defendants to a pretrial hearing to challenge a grand jury’s determination of
probable cause supporting the charges against them.4 A grand jury
indictment establishes that there is probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed a crime, and in some cases, can permit an
individual’s assets to be seized. The seizure of assets can leave the individual without sufficient funds to retain the legal counsel of his or
her choice.5
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1. 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1094.
5. The authority for such a criminal forfeiture is derived from the criminal forfeiture
statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012). The statute provides for the forfeiture of “(1) any property
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as
the result of [the] violation; (2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used,
in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, [the] violation.” Id.
§ 853(a). The statute also applies the forfeiture of such property to those who have been
indicted for an applicable crime, if “(i) there is a substantial probability that the United
States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order [of forfeiture] will result in the property being destroyed, removed from jurisdiction of the court,
or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and (ii) the need to preserve the availability
of the property through [forfeiture] outweighs the hardship on any party against whom
the order is to be entered.” Id. § 853(e).
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The Court concluded that the Constitution does not give the defendants a right to a pretrial hearing to relitigate the grand jury’s
finding of probable cause.6 Although the Kaley Court came to the
correct holding, the Court erred in concluding that the issue hinged
on the finality of the grand jury’s determination.7 For the purposes of
clarity and finality, the Court should have instead focused on the absence of such a hearing consequently limiting the defendant’s right to
counsel of choice, which precedent has shown to be a right separate
and distinct from the right to effective counsel.8 As the right to counsel of choice is qualified, the infringement of the right caused by a
denial of a pretrial hearing to contest probable cause is insufficient to
generate a constitutional violation.9
I. THE CASE
In January 2005, Kerri Kaley was informed that she and her husband, Brian Kaley, were under grand jury investigation for stealing
prescription medical devices from hospitals and selling them on the
black market.10 Both Kerri and Brian Kaley retained separate attorneys who informed them that the cumulative cost of their legal fees
would be approximately $500,000.11 The Kaleys responded by obtaining a home equity line of credit for $500,000 on their residence and
then used the proceeds to buy a certificate of deposit.12
Two years later, in February 2007, a grand jury in the Southern
District of Florida indicted the Kaleys on seven counts, including conspiracy to transport in interstate commerce prescription medical devices that they knew to be stolen.13 The indictment sought criminal
forfeiture14 of all of the Kaleys’ property traceable to the offenses, including the certificate of deposit.15 The district court granted the
government’s protective order, and the Kaleys moved to vacate, arguing that the order prevented them from retaining the counsel of their
6. Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1094.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See infra Part IV.A.1.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 1090
(2014). At the time, Kerri Kaley was working as a sales representative for Ethicon EndoSurgery. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The Kaleys were also indicted on five counts of substantive 18 U.S.C. § 2314
charges and one count of obstruction of justice. Id.
14. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012).
15. Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1318.
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choice in violation of their Sixth Amendment rights.16 They also filed
a motion expressly requesting a pretrial, post-restraint evidentiary
hearing.17 In May 2007, the magistrate judge issued an order finding
probable cause that the certificate of deposit and the Kaleys’ residence were involved in the violations, another order amending the
protective order to include the full value of the certificate of deposit
and the Kaleys’ residence, and a third order denying the Kaleys’ motion to vacate the protective order and hold a pretrial, post-restraint
evidentiary hearing.18
The Kaleys appealed the orders, and the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed, concluding that
the trial itself would satisfy due process.19 On June 27, 2007, the
Kaleys lodged an interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s
decision.20 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the district court’s denial of the evidentiary hearing and remanded
for further proceedings.21 On remand, the district court found that
the hearing was required.22
During the evidentiary hearing conducted on July 29, 2010, the
Kaleys focused on the scope of the hearing; they explained that they
were not contesting the traceability of the assets to the alleged conduct, but were instead arguing that the underlying facts did not even
support the crimes with which they were charged.23 The government

16. Id.
17. Id. A magistrate judge heard the initial motion raised by the Kaleys and sustained
the protective order, but the judge limited the scope of the order as it applied to the certificate of deposit to $140,000. Id. A month later, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment that added an additional count for money laundering and sought criminal forfeiture of the full certificate of deposit, as well as the Kaleys’ residence. Id. On April 17,
2007, the Kaleys renewed their motion to vacate the initial, amended protective order; it
was in this motion that they expressly requested a pretrial, post-restraint evidentiary hearing. Id. The magistrate responded to the motion by ordering the prosecutor to submit an
affidavit supporting probable cause. Id. The prosecutor filed an affidavit executed by the
FBI case agent, in secret and under seal, and in response to this affidavit the magistrate
judge issued the three orders denying the Kaleys’ motions. Id. at 1318–19.
18. Id. at 1318–19.
19. Id. at 1319.
20. Id.
21. United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009), appeal after remand,
United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012), aff’d, Kaley v. United States, 134 S.
Ct. 1090 (2014) (“[T]he district court plainly made an error of law in interpreting and applying the third of the Bissell factors. . . . Moreover, the district court did not make a clear
finding as to the fourth Bissell factor . . . . We, therefore, reverse the district court’s decision and remand the case to the district court . . . .”).
22. Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1319.
23. Id.
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in return argued that it was not required to offer substantive evidence
to establish the criminal charges, but that it was only required to
prove that the restrained assets were traceable to the offenses charged
in the indictment.24 In October 2010, the district court issued an order denying the Kaleys’ motion to vacate the protective order, concluding that the only relevant inquiry was the traceability of the assets.25 The Kaleys appealed three days later, and the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the Kaleys’ motion to vacate the
protective order was properly denied.26 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether due process or the right to
counsel constitutionally entitles criminal defendants to contest a
grand jury’s prior determination of probable cause to believe they
committed the crimes charged at a post-indictment pretrial hearing.27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court has created arguably blurry
lines demarcating the scope and parameters of the Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel as well as the Fifth Amendment right to
due process. Part II.A.1 of this Note discusses how the Court has
granted both expansive domain to the Sixth Amendment’s right to
counsel, while simultaneously significantly qualifying the right.28 Part
II.A.2 discusses how the Court has determined that the criminal forfeiture statute29 implicates the qualified right to counsel of choice, in
contrast to the separate and distinct right to adequate counsel.30 Part
II.B examines how the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
has complicated the analysis, particularly in light of the broad deference given to the grand jury institution.31 Part II.C focuses on the
case law generated from the consideration of these issues, which has
produced even less clarity as to where these lines are drawn and resulted in a split among the circuit courts over the permissive scope of
a pretrial hearing.32

24. Id. at 1319–20.
25. Id. at 1320.
26. Id. at 1330 (holding that the order was properly denied on the grounds that “a
defendant may not challenge the evidentiary support for the underlying charge at a hearing to determine the propriety of a post-indictment pretrial restraining order”).
27. Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1095, 1096 (2014).
28. See infra Part II.A.1.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012).
30. See infra Part II.A.2.
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part II.C.
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A. The Criminal Forfeiture Statute Does Not Violate the Sixth
Amendment
The Supreme Court of the United States has granted expansive
domain to the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel but has also significantly qualified the right in specific situations.33 The Court has determined that the criminal forfeiture statute implicates the qualified
right to counsel of choice, rather than the separate and distinct right
to adequate counsel.34 Therefore, the pretrial seizure of assets, even
though it may restrict a defendant’s ability to obtain the counsel of his
or her choice, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.35
1. The United States Supreme Court Has Granted Expansive Domain
to the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel but Has Similarly
Created Significant Qualifications to This Right
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an individual the right “to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”36 The Court has clarified the parameters of this right in several seminal cases, one of the
earliest being Powell v. Alabama,37 a case that involved nine AfricanAmerican men who were charged and convicted of raping two white
women on a train heading to Scottsboro, Alabama in 1931.38 As the
Powell Court noted, the defendants were not represented by counsel
upon arraignment, and no lawyer had been specifically named until
the morning of the trial.39 The Court reversed the convictions, holding that in a capital case in which a defendant is unable to employ his
own counsel, it is “the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to
assign counsel for him” and emphasized that it must be done in a
time and manner to ensure effective aid before and during the trial.40
The Court also emphasized that “the failure of the trial court to give

33. See infra Part II.A.1.
34. See infra Part II A.1.
35. See infra Part II A.2.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
38. Id. at 49–51.
39. Id. at 56. The Court also noted that the appointment of counsel—supposedly an
appointment of all members of the bar to the defense—was “little more than an expansive
gesture, imposing no substantial or definite obligation upon any one” and that prior to the
trial one of the members of the bar had accepted employment for the prosecution. Id.
40. Id. at 71.
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[the defendants] reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel
was a clear denial of due process.”41
In Strickland v. Washington,42 the Supreme Court further expanded the right to counsel by considering the quality of counsel as part of
that right.43 The Court explained that the adequacy of an accused’s
counsel is a crucial part of the constitutional right to a fair trial, as
recognized in the Sixth Amendment.44 The Court reasoned that “access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution’ to
which they are entitled.”45 The Court then explained that whether
counsel is ineffective to the point of giving rise to a constitutional violation is determined by whether or not the defendant has received a
fair trial.46 To measure this violation, the Strickland Court held that
two factors are to be considered: first, showing that counsel was deficient, having made errors so serious that counsel could no longer be
considered “counsel” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and second, proving that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense.47 The Strickland test has become the standard to determine the
threshold for insufficient counsel.48
The Court demonstrated that the right to counsel can be qualified, however, in Wheat v. United States.49 The case raised the issue of
whether it was within the district court’s discretion to decline a defendant’s voluntary waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel by re41. Id. (“In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion—the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility,
the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the
fact that their friends and families were all in other states and communication with them
necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives—we think
the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process.”).
42. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
43. Id. at 685.
44. Id. at 685–86.
45. Id. at 685 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275
(1942)).
46. Id. at 686 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”).
47. Id. at 687.
48. See, e.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014) (holding that the Alabama
courts did not correctly apply the Strickland test to the defendant’s case); Chaidez v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (explaining that the Court has granted relief under Strickland in diverse contexts); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (explaining how to apply Strickland’s prejudice test in the context of plea offers).
49. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
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fusing to permit his proposed substitution of counsel.50 The Court
explained that the essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to “guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to
ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer
whom he prefers.”51 Thus, the Court held that the deference to a petitioner’s preferred counsel of choice can be overcome by showing
the potential for a conflict.52
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,53 the Court demonstrated that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is a qualified right,
both separate and distinct from the right to effective counsel.54 In
Gonzalez-Lopez, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, and his family hired a Missouri attorney, John Fahle, to represent him.55 Gonzalez-Lopez also
contacted and hired a California lawyer, Joseph Low, to represent
him, but during the course of an evidentiary hearing the judge revoked Low’s provisional acceptance to appear in court because he violated a court rule.56 Despite repeated efforts, Low was unable to regain permission to represent the defendant.57 The jury found the
defendant guilty, and he appealed.58 The Eighth Circuit vacated the
conviction, holding that the district court misinterpreted the rule that
Low violated, on which the court based its denials of his motions for

50. Id. at 154.
51. Id. at 159.
52. Id. at 164 (“The District Court must recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner’s counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. The evaluation
of the facts and circumstances of each case under this standard must be left primarily to
the informed judgment of the trial court.”).
53. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
54. Id. at 142.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Magistrate Judge found Joseph Low to have violated the court rule restricting the cross-examination of a witness to one counsel because he was passing notes to
John Fahle during cross-examination. Id.
57. Acting on the respondent’s wishes, Low filed two successive applications for admission, both of which were denied by the district court, and an appeal, which was dismissed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id. Fahle filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel, which was granted, and respondent retained a local attorney, Karl
Dickhaus, to represent him for his trial. Id. at 142–43. Low again applied for and was denied permission for admission and was ordered to have no contact with Dickhaus during
proceedings. Id. at 143. A United States Marshal sat between Low and Dickhaus at trial to
enforce the court order. Id.
58. Id. at 143.
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admittance, and therefore violated respondent’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of his choice.59
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and subsequently held
that no additional showing of prejudice sustained by the defendant is
required when deprivation of counsel is erroneous and that such an
error requires the Court to vacate the conviction.60 The Court, however, was careful to point out the distinction between the Sixth
Amendment right to effective representation and the right to select
counsel of one’s choice, the latter being violated “whenever the defendant’s choice is wrongfully denied.”61 The Court explained that
these are two separate rights, and the deprivation of the right to one’s
counsel of choice is complete when a defendant is erroneously deprived of the counsel that he chooses to represent him, regardless of
the quality of that representation.62 The Court also reiterated that a
violation of an individual’s right to counsel of his or her choice does
not extend to those defendants who require counsel to be appointed
for them and cited several other legitimate qualifications on the right
to choice of counsel.63
2. The United States Supreme Court Determined That the Forfeiture
Statute Does Not Exempt Legal Fees and Is Constitutional
The Supreme Court has addressed challenges to the constitutionality of the criminal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. Section 853, in
the right to counsel context in two cases, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States64 and United States v. Monsanto,65 both decided on the
same day. The statute provides for pretrial seizure of any assets held
by an individual convicted or indicted on the crimes specified, provided those assets are found traceable to the crime.66 Monsanto addressed the question of whether the forfeiture statute authorized the
district court to enter a pretrial order freezing assets in a defendant’s
possession, even when the defendant seeks to use those assets to pay

59. Id. at 143–44.
60. Id. at 144, 146, 152.
61. Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted).
62. Id. at 147–48.
63. Id. at 151–52 (noting that a defendant may not be represented by counsel who is
not a member of the bar or demand that a court grant his waiver of conflict-free representation) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159–60 (1988); Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624, 626 (1989)).
64. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
65. 491 U.S. 600 (1989), remanded to 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991).
66. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012).
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an attorney, and if so, whether such an order was constitutional.67
Caplin & Drysdale addressed the similar question of whether the forfeiture statute includes an exemption for assets that a defendant wishes to use to pay an attorney in the criminal case where forfeiture exists, and if the statute, as interpreted without such an exemption, is
constitutional in light of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.68
Both holdings, which cited each other, agreed that the district
court is authorized to enter such a pretrial order freezing the defendant’s assets, that there is not an exemption for assets needed to pay
for legal fees, and that the statute is not a violation of either the Fifth
or Sixth Amendments.69 The Monsanto opinion explained that the
text of the statute is clear and unambiguous in its failure to exclude
assets that could be used to pay an attorney from forfeiture.70 The
Court also looked to the construction of the statute’s text and noted
that the language of “[Section] 853(e)(1)(A) is plainly aimed at implementing the commands of [Section] 853(a) and cannot sensibly
be construed to give the district court discretion to permit the dissipation of the very property that [Section] 853(a) requires be forfeited
upon conviction.”71 The Monsanto opinion also examined the legislative history of the statute, finding that the foremost objective in drafting the statute was to preserve the availability of the property in question and to ensure that defendants do not profit from criminal acts.72
In its discussion, the Monsanto opinion deferred to the Caplin &
Drysdale opinion, which specifically addressed the lack of Fifth and
Sixth Amendment violations raised by the statute’s authorization of
pretrial criminal forfeiture of assets intended to be used to pay legal
counsel.73 The Caplin & Drysdale opinion explained that a defendant
cannot give good title to his or her assets, even if used to pay an attorney, because the assets were vested in the United States at the time
67. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 602.
68. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619.
69. See id. at 623; Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 602, 614 (“In another decision we announce
today, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, . . . we hold that neither the Fifth nor
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution requires Congress to permit a defendant to use
assets adjudged to be forfeitable to pay that defendant’s legal fees. We rely on our conclusion in that case to dispose of the similar constitutional claims raised by the respondent
here.”).
70. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 608–09.
71. Id. at 612–13.
72. Id. at 613–14 (noting that “this view is supported by the relevant legislative history”
and that Congress’ intent, as well as the statute’s text itself, makes it clear that “the statute,
as presently written, cannot be read any other way”).
73. Id. at 614 (explaining that “[w]e rely on our conclusion in [Caplin & Drysdale] to
dispose of the similar constitutional claims raised by respondent here”).
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the criminal act giving rise to the forfeiture took place.74 The Court
also conducted a balancing test and concluded that the “strong governmental interest in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets”
outweighs “any Sixth Amendment interest in permitting criminals to
use assets adjudged forfeitable to pay for their defense.”75 The Caplin
& Drysdale Court similarly disposed of the Fifth Amendment challenge, which it summarized as the accusation that the power available
to prosecutors under the forfeiture provision could potentially be
abused, resulting in a violation of due process.76 The Court concluded that just because the provision could be abused does not by itself
make the law facially invalid.77 Additionally, as several circuit courts
later noted, the Monsanto Court explicitly stated that it was not considering “whether the Due Process Clause requires a hearing before a
pretrial restraining order can be imposed.”78
B. The Role of the Grand Jury Is a Key Component in Defining the Scope
of the Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process in the Context of the
Criminal Forfeiture Statute
The Fifth Amendment provides in part that, “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
74. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 627. The Court also noted that there is no “distinction between, or hierarchy among, constitutional rights” and that as a defendant has no
similar right to spend forfeitable assets on the right to free speech, to practice one’s religion, or to travel, which also depend on finances, it would therefore be illogical to make
an exception in this case for the right to counsel. Id. at 628.
75. Id. at 631.
76. See id. at 633–34 (explaining that even if “the Fifth Amendment provides some
added protection not encompassed in the Sixth Amendment’s more specific provisions,”
the Constitution “does not forbid the imposition of an otherwise permissible criminal
sanction, such as forfeiture, merely because in some cases prosecutors may abuse the processes available to them”).
77. Id. at 634.
78. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 615 n.10; see, e.g., United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411,
416 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Monsanto Court “left open for the circuit’s decision
on remand” whether such a hearing is required by due process); United States v. Jamieson,
427 F.3d 394, 406 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Monsanto Court “specifically refrained from ruling on whether due process requires such a probable cause hearing”);
United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 803 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the Monsanto
Court “expressly left open” whether the Fifth Amendment requires the pretrial hearing);
United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that its holding is
“not at odds” with the Supreme Court because neither the Monsanto nor the Caplin &
Drysdale Court decided whether due process requires a hearing allowing the challenge to
whether or not the assets are forfeitable); United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1190–
91 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the Monsanto Court “declined . . . to address the procedural aspects of such a pretrial restraint of property” and remanded the case for further
proceedings).
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law . . . .”79 The Supreme Court has held that at the very least, the
Due Process Clause requires that such deprivations be preceded by
notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the case.80 A
traditional function of the grand jury is to screen for unfounded criminal charges.81 The role of the grand jury, as it has been defined by
the courts, is therefore a key component in defining the scope of the
Fifth Amendment right to Due Process as it applies to the Criminal
Forfeiture Statute.
In Costello v. United States,82 the Supreme Court examined whether
a grand jury indictment could be challenged on the basis that the only type of evidence presented was hearsay.83 The Court looked to the
Constitution in its analysis and found it to be silent on the types of evidence upon which grand juries may or may not act.84 The Court also
considered the history of the grand jury and explained that grand jurors have traditionally acted on their own knowledge, “unfettered by
technical rules.”85 The Costello Court thus held that “[a]n indictment
returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury” is enough
to satisfy the Fifth Amendment, even if the only evidence before the
grand jury was hearsay.86
Less than two years later, the Supreme Court was again asked to
establish a rule which would allow a grand jury indictment to be challenged on the grounds of inadequate evidence in Lawn v. United
States.87 The Lawn Court refused to establish such a rule, noting that
“this Court has several times ruled that an indictment returned by a
legally constituted nonbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face . . . sat-

79. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
80. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)
(holding that at a minimum the Due Process Clause requires that deprivation of life, liberty or property be proceeded by notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the
case).
81. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (explaining that the grand jury
“has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution”).
82. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
83. Id. at 359.
84. Id. at 362 (“But neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must act.”).
85. Id. at 362–64.
86. Id. at 361, 363.
87. 355 U.S. 339 (1958). The Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision, holding that the defendants were not deprived
of due process by the refusal to hold a hearing to investigate whether the grand jury considered certain evidence when it returned the indictment. Id. at 348–50.
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isfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.”88 The Court was also careful to distinguish the case at hand from a case dealing with “incompetent or illegal evidence in a trial on the merits,” and instead
held that the situation conformed with the precedent set in Costello.89
The unassailability of grand jury indictments was further affirmed
in Bracy v. United States,90 in which a witness admitted to having committed perjury during the grand jury proceedings that led to the indictment of the defendant.91 The Court denied the petition for certiorari review and a request to stay the enforcement of the judgment.92
Again, in United States v. Calandra,93 the Court further bolstered the
grand jury’s invulnerability by refusing to extend the exclusionary
rule to grand jury proceedings.94 In its holding, the Court emphasized that allowing witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rule before a
grand jury would expose issues reserved for the trial and delay proceedings.95 The Court explained that such suppression hearings
would require extended litigation that would transform the hearing
into a trial on the merits and potentially fatally delay the enforcement
of criminal law.96
Over thirty years after Costello, the Supreme Court again reinforced the finality of grand jury determinations in United States v. Williams97 by holding that a facially valid indictment may not be dismissed
because the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury.98 The Court found that the Tenth Circuit’s attempt to require a mandatory disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the grand jury was unsupported by its supervisory power.99 The Court explained
that because the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts,
there is no supervisory judicial authority over the conduct of the
88. Id. at 349.
89. Id. at 349–50.
90. 435 U.S. 1301 (1978).
91. Id. at 1301.
92. Id. at 1301, 1303. Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated the principle that the function of the grand jury is not to “sit to determine the truth of the charges brought” but instead “only to determine whether there is probable cause to believe them true.” Id. at
1302.
93. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
94. Id. at 354 (“In the context of a grand jury proceeding, we believe that the damage
to that institution from the unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule urged by
respondent outweighs the benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect.”).
95. Id. at 349.
96. Id. at 350.
97. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
98. Id. at 55.
99. Id. at 45–47.
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grand jury, and the courts therefore cannot prescribe standards for
the grand jury to follow in their proceedings.100
Through this progression of cases, by a process of elimination
and rejecting grounds for potential evidentiary challenges, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the primary method by which to
invalidate a grand jury indictment is to allege that the grand jury was
illegally constituted, such as in cases of purposeful discrimination.101
Even then, it is an uphill battle; multiple courts have found the burden of proof of discrimination to be on the defendant102 and the failure to raise a discrimination challenge in a timely manner to be the
equivalent of waiver.103 In short, the sanctity of the grand jury’s role
in making determinations of probable cause is well established and
difficult to assail.
The Supreme Court has also used a balancing test introduced in
Mathews v. Eldridge104 to further determine the scope of the Due Pro100. See id. at 46–47 (“[T]he supervisory power can be used to dismiss an indictment
because of misconduct before the grand jury, at least where that misconduct amounts to a
violation of one of those ‘few, clear rules which were carefully drafted and approved by this
Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury’s functions.’” (quoting
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986))).
101. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow a defendant to move to dismiss a
grand jury indictment on the basis that it was not “lawfully drawn, summoned, or selected.”
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(b)(1). Selection procedures of a grand or petit jury may be challenged
on the basis of discrimination on account of “race, color, religion, sex, national origin or
economic status.” 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e) (2012).
102. United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 657 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the burden
is on the defendant to show a “substantial failure” in proportional representation which is
greater than “[m]ere technical violations”); see also United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d
730, 733 (9th Cir. 1974) (explaining that defendants have the burden of showing prima
facie discrimination in jury selection); United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.
La. 1973), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
defendants must show “substantial failure” of complying with 28 U.S.C. § 1867, resulting in
an intentional underrepresentation).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that failure
to move to dismiss an indictment before the voir dire examination begins, or within seven
days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered, by the exercise of diligence,
the grounds therefore constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the racial composition
of the grand jury which indicted him); United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir.
1976) (explaining that when the defendant accepts the jury, he waives the right to object
to any errors in the jury selection process); Ward v. United States, 486 F.2d 305 (5th Cir.
1973) (holding that the appellant waived his right to challenge the racial composition of
the grand jury that indicted him by failing to raise the issue by motion before trial).
104. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews Court considered whether due process required an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of an individual’s Social Security
benefit payments. Id. at 323. The Government in Kaley argued that because of the Court’s
recent decision in Medina v. California, which held that the Mathews test was not the appropriate framework for addressing the validity of state procedural rules that are part of the
criminal process, the Mathews test is similarly not applicable to determinations of the valid-
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cess Clause.105 Mathews raised the issue of when an individual’s Fifth
Amendment due process guarantee requires that an individual be
given an opportunity to contest administrative action prior to the implementation of these actions.106 The Mathews Court held that due
process requires the consideration of three factors: the private interest that will be affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of this interest through the procedures used and the
probable value of any procedural safeguards, and the Government’s
interest, including the burden that the additional safeguard would
entail.107 The Court explained the necessity of the test by rationalizing that the “essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person
in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him
and opportunity to meet it.’”108
The Court also reasoned that precedent has consistently held
that some form of hearing has generally been required before an individual is permanently deprived of a property interest.109 The Court
also noted, however, that due process is not a “technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances” and
that it is “flexible” and requires situation-specific protections.110 As a
result of these concerns, and the factors considered in precedent, the
Mathews Court established the three-factor test to ensure accuracy and
to ultimately satisfy due process.111

ity of criminal forfeiture orders. Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1101 (2014) (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)). The Kaley Court declined to “define the
respective reach of Mathews and Medina, because we need not do so.” Id.
105. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 334–35.
108. Id. at 348 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
109. Id. at 333. The Mathews Court further explained that “Eldridge agrees that the
review procedures available to a claimant before the initial determination of ineligibility
becomes final would be adequate if disability benefits were not terminated until after the
evidentiary hearing stage of the administrative process. The dispute centers upon what
process is due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending review.” Id. The Court
has also held that in some cases due process does not guarantee any process to an individual because the violation could not be predicted. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)
(holding that even though the respondent, an inmate of a Nebraska prison, was permanently deprived of his property, the deprivation was not the result of an established state
procedure but the failure of the state agents to follow the established procedure, and thus
due process could be adequately satisfied by a subsequent tort claim).
110. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 334–35 (holding that “our prior decisions indicate that identification of the
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”).
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The Mathews balancing test has been applied by several of the
circuits to determine the necessity of a pretrial hearing to contest the
seizure of assets under the criminal forfeiture statute.112 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in United States v. E-Gold, Ltd.,113
noted that the lack of an opportunity to have an evidentiary, adversary
hearing could potentially give rise to a due process infringement, particularly in instances when the seizure led to an inability to retain
counsel of choice.114 The Appellants, however, requested an evidentiary hearing to address the existence of probable cause, and the
Court of Appeals also recognized that in some cases “it may be impossible to afford a full adversarial hearing” before seizure.115 The Court
of Appeals also noted that the government may have rights in the
property at issue that require immediate action.116 The determination
of whether a due process violation would occur, the court concluded,
required “further inquiry.”117 Furthermore, as the Mathews test had
been previously employed in situations of “protected interests”
threatened by official action, and other circuits had used the test in
cases involving criminal forfeiture, the E-Gold court held that application of the Mathews test was required.118
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also
concluded, in United States v. Moya-Gomez,119 that in order to determine
if a party’s Fifth Amendment right to due process is violated by refusing an immediate post-restraint hearing, the Mathews test must be applied to the facts of the case.120 The court first determined that the
forfeiture caused the defendant to suffer a deprivation of property in
the constitutional sense.121 The court then asked whether the depri-

112. See, e.g., United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting
that the Second Circuit applied the three Mathews factors and that therefore it must as
well); United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 805 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that after
“[c]onsidering the three Mathews factors as they apply to Farmer,” due process required a
hearing to challenge probable cause); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 645 (10th Cir.
1998) (explaining that the determination of whether due process requires a post-restraint,
pretrial hearing requires that the three Mathews test factors be considered); United States
v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 726 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the due process determination for a particular setting requires an analysis consisting of the three Mathews factors).
113. 521 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
114. Id. at 415.
115. Id. at 413, 415–16.
116. Id. at 415–16.
117. Id. at 416.
118. Id. at 415–19.
119. United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988).
120. Id. at 725–26.
121. Id. at 725.
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vation of this property met the requirements of the Due Process
Clause.122 In order to answer this question, the court determined, the
three factors enumerated in the Mathews test must be weighed.123 The
Moya-Gomez court indicates that application of the Mathews test is critical because without it, the present statutory scheme created by 21
U.S.C. Section 853, the criminal forfeiture statute, provides no opportunity to question the government’s contention that certain property
is subject to forfeiture, and therefore violated due process when the
forfeiture renders the defendant unable to retain his or her counsel
of choice.124
C. The Circuits Have Split on What Grounds an Order to Restrain
Assets May Be Challenged During a Pretrial Hearing
The circuits have concluded that a pretrial hearing to challenge a
restraining order issued pursuant to the forfeiture statute is required
to satisfy due process but split on the issue of what exactly may be
challenged. After applying the Mathews test, the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Moya-Gomez125 concluded that an immediate, adversarial
hearing is required to satisfy due process, provided that the restraining order implicates funds that have been demonstrated to be necessary to defendants in retaining the counsel of their choice.126 The
Seventh Circuit, however, limited such a hearing to the issue of
whether the assets are subject to forfeiture and noted that the court
“may not inquire as to the validity of the indictment”127 and must accept that the probable cause decision made by the grand jury is “determinative.”128 In a subsequent case, United States v. Michelle’s
Lounge,129 the Seventh Circuit clarified a district court’s confusion in
applying the Moya-Gomez holding.130 The Court applied the Mathews
test and concluded that a post-seizure adversary hearing on probable

122. Id. at 726.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 729.
125. 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988).
126. Id. at 728–30.
127. Id. at 728.
128. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3386 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. 39 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1994).
130. Id. at 688, 691. “Thus, the most accurate description of the district court’s order is
that although it released two assets, . . . it otherwise denied Messino’s motion that MoyaGomez required an adversary hearing or the release of sufficient assets to pay attorney’s
fees. We are thus called upon to review whether Moya-Gomez’s requirements are applicable
here.” Id. at 691.

2015]

KALEY v. UNITED STATES

393

cause is required even when the assets are seized through civil forfeiture, provided they are needed to obtain counsel.131 The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Farmer,132 similarly limited the hearing to the
very narrow purpose of determining whether some of the assets seized
may have been untainted.133
Several circuits have fallen on the other side of the spectrum,
holding that there can never be a hearing to contest probable cause.
For example, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Jones134 held that the
lower court may not revisit any matter to which probable cause is established in the indictment.135 The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Jamieson136 followed the Jones Court.137 The Ninth Circuit reviewed a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration in a matter that
dealt with seized funds in United States v. Dejanu.138 The Ninth Circuit
held that a lack of new evidence is sufficient grounds alone for denying the motion.139 The Court further elaborated, however, explaining
that a restraining order under the criminal forfeiture statute is constitutional as long as the district court holds a hearing to determine
whether probable cause exists, provided that probable cause is found
independently from the indictment during this hearing.140
Finally, the Second Circuit’s holdings are the most favorable for
the defendants, such as in United States v. Monsanto,141 on remand
from the Supreme Court. In Monsanto, the Second Circuit explicitly
held that grand jury determinations of probable cause may be consid-

131. Id. at 700–01. “The criminal defendant whose assets have been seized via civil forfeiture is deprived of a significant interest just as if the assets were restrained pursuant to
criminal forfeiture.” Id. at 701.
132. 274 F.3d 800 (4th Cir. 2001).
133. See id. at 801 (“[W]e . . . remand with directions to hold a hearing for the limited
purpose of determining whether untainted assets have been seized and whether Farmer
requires those assets to hire counsel.”).
134. 160 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 1998).
135. Id. at 644.
136. 427 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2005).
137. See id. at 407 (noting that “[w]e have no quarrel with the district court’s decision
to apply Jones” particularly in light of the fact that the defendant in this case “failed to allege prejudice,” had “not even voiced dissatisfaction with his two trial attorneys,” and
“cannot show that he was deprived of counsel of his own choosing, because the record indicates that his primary court-appointed attorney was, in fact, his counsel of choice”).
138. 37 F. App’x 870, 871 (9th Cir. 2002).
139. Id. at 873.
140. Id.
141. 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991).
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ered at the pretrial hearing.142 The District of Columbia Circuit in
United States v. E-Gold, Ltd.143 followed the Second Circuit’s holding.144
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Kaley v. United States, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, holding that the Due
Process Clause, even when combined with the defendants’ Sixth
Amendment interests, does not command a pretrial hearing to contest the grand jury’s finding of probable cause supporting the charges
against them.145 The Court reasoned that the decisions in Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States and United States v. Monsanto had already “cast the die” on this case as well, because these cases concluded
that the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process and the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel do not constrain the way that federal
forfeiture statutes apply to assets needed to retain an attorney.146
The Kaley Court first reiterated the holding in Caplin and Drysdale, which concluded that a defendant does not have a Sixth
Amendment right to spend another person’s money, even if this
means that he will not be able to retain the attorney of his choice.147
As the assets seized from a defendant pursuant to the forfeiture statute are considered “not rightfully his,” they cannot be spent by the
defendant.148 The Kaley Court then looked to Monsanto, which reaffirmed that as long as there was probable cause, the freeze on a person’s assets is valid.149
The Kaley Court stated that the primary issue raised in this case is
who should have the last word on probable cause, and the Court concluded that the “fundamental and historic commitment of our criminal justice system is to entrust those probable cause findings to grand

142. See id. at 1199 (“[W]e concededly would require reconsideration of probable cause
determinations made by a grand jury in the course of returning an indictment, contrary to
the view expressed in the Senate Report.”).
143. 521 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
144. See id. at 419 (“We thus join the Second Circuit in holding that defendants have a
right to an adversary post-restraint, pretrial hearing for the purpose of establishing whether there was probable cause ‘as to the defendant[s’] guilt . . . .” (citing Monsanto, 924 F.2d
at 1195)).
145. Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094, 1096 (2014).
146. Id. at 1096.
147. Id. (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623–35
(1989)).
148. Id. (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626).
149. Id. at 1097 (citing United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989)).
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juries.”150 The Court first looked to precedent to support this conclusion, explaining that the totality of the case law has consistently held
that the grand jury gets to determine whether probable cause exists,
“without any review, oversight, or second-guessing.”151 The Court
found that similar statutes also supported the finality of the grand jury’s finding.152 The Kaley Court compared 21 U.S.C. Section 853 to
the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which denies judicial reconsideration of
an indictment returned by a proper grand jury finding probable
cause, and explained that as such the Bail Reform Act is evidence of
the lack of constitutional compulsion to require any additional inquiry.153 Finally, the Court cited a host of potential “strange and destructive consequences,” including the possibility for multiple, inconsistent findings, an undermining of the grand jury’s role in the
criminal justice system, and the likely freezing of the prosecutor’s case
if the grand jury determinations were allowed to be disputed during a
pretrial hearing.154
The Kaley Court declined to address the applicability and reach
of the Mathews v. Eldridge155 balancing test in this situation, because
the balancing enquiry is not capable of “trumping this Court’s repeated admonitions that the grand jury’s word is conclusive.”156 Even if it
were able to do so, however, the Court explained that the test tips
against the Kaleys and they would still not be entitled to a hearing to
contest probable cause.157 When conducting the test, the Court noted
the significant government interest in freezing potentially forfeitable
assets and the substantial use of judicial resources that such a hearing
would consume, as well as the heavy burden the freeze places on the
defendants’ ability to hire the lawyer of their choice.158

150. Id.
151. Id. at 1097–98 (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54 (1992); and Bank of
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988)).
152. Id. at 1098 n.6.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1099–1100.
155. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
156. Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1101.
157. Id. (explaining that the test tips against the Kaleys because “the problem . . . comes
from Mathews’ prescribed inquiry into the requested procedure’s usefulness in correcting
erroneous deprivations of their private interest” and that as “a seizure of the Kaleys’ property is erroneous only if unsupported by probable cause, the added procedure demanded
here is not sufficiently likely to make any difference”).
158. Id. at 1101–03.
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The Court particularly emphasized the importance of the final
prong of the test, which boils the issue down to the probable value of
the judicial hearing in uncovering a mistaken grand jury finding of
probable cause.159 The Court concluded that both the Supreme
Court precedent and other courts’ experiences “indicate that a fulldress hearing will provide little benefit” because of the relatively low
bar set by the probable cause standard.160 The Kaley Court even went
so far as to analyze the potential arguments that the Kaleys could pursue at a pretrial hearing for assessing probable cause, including attacking the evidence that the Government had previously offered in
support of the allegations and introducing new evidence.161 Neither
of these methods would be successful, the Court explained, because
the adversarial process has relatively little impact on the threshold
finding of probable cause.162 The Court then pointed out the inability
of anyone to find a case in which an indictment had been overturned
on rehearing because of insufficient probable cause.163
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the possibility for
abuse by the prosecution, specifically the ability of the prosecutor to
take away a defendant’s ability to choose his or her own counsel, implicates the overall fairness of the trial, as protected by the Sixth
Amendment.164 He contended that the deprivation of the right to
counsel in this case is a permanent deprivation, one that is lost once
the trial begins, and therefore the Kaleys must have an opportunity to
meaningfully challenge that deprivation before the trial begins.165 The
Chief Justice also disputed the majority’s application of the Mathews
test factors, maintaining that the Kaleys’ interests at stake were
shortchanged and the government’s interests and potential concerns
were exaggerated.166
IV. ANALYSIS
In Kaley v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, even when considered in combination with an individual’s Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, does not command a pretrial hearing to contest the grand
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 1104.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1107–08 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1111.
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jury’s finding of probable cause for the offenses permitting criminal
forfeiture.167 The Kaley Court erred in concluding that this issue
hinged on the conclusiveness of a grand jury’s determination.168 Even
though the Court came to the correct holding, the Court used precarious grounds.169 The practical result of the holding is that a traceability hearing is required by Due Process but a probable cause hearing is
not.170 The deference due to the grand jury is far from a settled matter,171 and as such, the Court should have instead focused on the absence of a hearing depriving an individual of the counsel of his or her
choice.172 An infringement upon the right to counsel of choice,
which is separate and distinct from the right to adequate counsel and
does not apply to indigent defendants, has been deemed insufficient
to generate a constitutional violation.173 The digression into a discussion of the function and necessity of the grand jury, and the importance of maintaining the finality of grand jury determinations, is
an unnecessary and distracting detour. This digression could potentially cause confusion among the district courts when interpreting the
Kaley decision and could be considered a violation of the Supreme
Court’s avoidance principles.174
A. The Kaley Court Should Have Focused on the Conclusion That the
Deprivation of the Right to One’s Choice of Counsel Does Not Give
Rise to a Constitutional Violation
The Supreme Court was correct in determining that the denial of
a pretrial hearing does not give rise to a constitutional violation, and
therefore such a hearing is not constitutionally required. The Kaley
Court failed to adequately consider, however, the central issue in the
case: that the absence of a hearing severely limits or even eradicates
an individual’s right to counsel of choice.175 The right to counsel of

167. Id. at 1094, 1096 (majority opinion).
168. See infra Part IV.A.
169. See infra Part IV.B.
170. See infra Part IV.B.1.
171. See infra Part IV.B.2.
172. See infra Part IV.A.
173. See infra Part IV.A.
174. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application.”).
175. See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1102 (2014) (recognizing the right to
counsel of choice as a “vital interest” and considering it only as a factor in the balancing
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choice is a right described by the Court as “‘the root meaning’ of the
Sixth Amendment” and one that “matters profoundly” to defendants
like the Kaleys.176 Yet when considering the weight of this right in the
framework of the Mathews balancing test—even though the Court declined to consider the test’s applicability to this case it proceeded to
undertake the analysis regardless—the Kaley Court readily dispenses
with the right to counsel’s relevance in this context.177 The Court accomplishes this by reasoning that, as explained by the Monsanto
Court, an asset freeze depriving a defendant of the counsel of his or
her choice is only erroneous when conducted without a finding of
probable cause.178 As the grand jury found that in this case there was
probable cause, the burden on the right, even though “weighty,” is
permissible.179 The Court failed to hold that the right to counsel of
choice is a separate and distinct right from the right to counsel, and
as the right to counsel of choice does not apply to indigent defendants, the Kaleys have suffered no constitutional violation.180 It is on
these grounds, rather than on the basis of the inviolability of the
grand jury, that the Kaleys’ case should have been resolved.
1. The Right to Counsel of Choice Is a Right That Is Separate and
Distinct from the Right to Counsel
It is important to clarify that the right to counsel is a right that is
separate and distinct from the right to counsel of choice.181 A violation of the right to counsel of one’s choice has been defined by the
Supreme Court as one that is completed when a defendant has been
“erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he
wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he received.”182
The right to adequate counsel, in contrast, was discussed at length in
Strickland v. Washington,183 which devised a two-part test to determine
whether or not that right has been violated.184 The defendant first
must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient by
test, but failing to consider it in the context as an enumerated right that could potentially
give rise to a constitutional violation).
176. Id. at 1102–03.
177. Id. at 1103.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See infra note 196.
181. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006).
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
184. Id. at 687; see supra note 47 (describing the two-step Strickland adequate counsel
test).
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showing that the errors made by counsel were of such a serious nature
that the defendant did not have “counsel” in the same sense as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and second, the defendant must
show that as a result of the deficient performance, the defense was
prejudiced.185
In contrast to the right to counsel, the right to counsel of choice
has been repeatedly held to be a qualified right.186 In Wheat v. United
States, the Supreme Court explained that a defendant has no right to
counsel that he cannot afford, to counsel who declines to represent
the defendant, or to counsel who has a conflict of interest as a result
of representing an opposing party.187 The Gonzalez-Lopez Court noted
further limitations on the right, including the inability of a defendant
to be represented by a person who is not a member of the bar.188 In
short, the Supreme Court has held that the courts have an “independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within
the ethical standards of the profession” and as such, limitations of the
right to counsel of choice can be validly imposed to accommodate
this “institutional interest.”189
The criminal forfeiture statute advances exactly these types of legitimate institutional interests of the court, in addition to government
institutional interests.190 Therefore limiting the right to counsel of
choice in this instance, by denying a pretrial hearing that will contest
an indictment allowing the seizure of assets that are intended to be
used to retain one’s counsel of choice, is compatible with the previously held qualified nature of that right. This is therefore not an infringement that gives rise to a constitutional violation. The Kaley
Court could have and should have ended its analysis there, without
unnecessarily wading into the murky waters of grand jury reviewability.

185. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
186. See supra notes 183–85.
187. 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
188. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151–52 (2006).
189. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160.
190. See, e.g., Kaley, at 1101–02 (discussing the governmental interest in criminal forfeiture); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 627 (1989) (discussing
the substantial nature of the property rights the forfeiture statute gives the government).
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The Right to Counsel of Choice Does Not Apply to Indigent
Defendants and as a Result of a Valid Indictment, the Kaleys Are
Indigent Defendants

Most critically, the Kaley Court failed to recognize that the right
to counsel of choice is also not applicable to indigent defendants, and
therefore the forfeiture of assets that renders a defendant unable to
afford his preferred representation, while a deprivation, is not a constitutional violation.191 In 1963, the Supreme Court extended the
Powell v. Alabama holding in Gideon v. Wainwright192 by holding that
the right to appointed counsel applied to all felony cases, including
state crimes, in addition to capital cases.193 Less than ten years after
Gideon, the Supreme Court extended the right to appointed counsel
even further in Argersinger v. Hamlin,194 holding that unless the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his or her right to
counsel, an individual has the right to appointed counsel in any case
in which he or she is threatened with imprisonment, regardless of
whether it is a misdemeanor or felony crime.195 These extensions to
indigent defendants’ right to appointed counsel in effect bolster and
protect their right to adequate counsel as well. This creates a sharp
contrast to the right to counsel of choice, which as the Gonzalez-Lopez
Court explicitly stated, “does not extend to defendants who require
counsel to be appointed for them.”196
The argument has been raised that the government is attempting
to blunt the adversary system in favor of the prosecution through the
use of the forfeiture statute, which prevents defendants from being
able to afford their counsel of choice.197 As the Kaley Court points
out, however, the “majority of criminal defendants proceed with appointed counsel” and “the Court has never thought . . . that doing so

191. See, e.g., Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1102 n.13 (noting that a restraint on assets would require the appointment of effective counsel and that appointed counsel has never been
held by the Court to be less effective or unfair). The Court fails to note the crucial distinction between the right to effective counsel and the right to counsel of choice, how forfeiture impacts the former but not the latter, and therefore is not a violation of the Sixth
Amendment. Id.
192. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
193. Id. at 339–40, 344 (explaining that the right to counsel is a fundamental right, and
is essential to a fair trial in all criminal cases, in both state and federal courts).
194. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
195. Id. at 37.
196. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006).
197. See Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 80 & n.299 (1991).
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risks the ‘fundamental fairness of the actual trial.’”198 Publicly provided legal counsel is not a rare or uncommon occurrence; in fact, about
three-fourths of state prison inmates and about half of those inmates
in federal prisons reported using publically provided counsel for the
offenses for which they were serving.199 While it is a reality that the
sheer number of defendants unable to afford representation in combination with insufficient funding and resources are challenges to the
quality of public defenders,200 due process nevertheless sets the standard that each and every defendant receive equal, constitutionally adequate treatment within the justice system.201 Placing all defendants on
equal footing, regardless of their financial status, is a principle that
the courts have strived to uphold.202
Defendants who have had their assets legitimately frozen by the
forfeiture statute in effect are placed in the same position as defendants who cannot afford to pay for an attorney.203 As such, in this instance, the right to counsel of choice does not apply to defendants
such as the Kaleys, and the right to effective counsel can be satisfied
by appointing a qualified attorney to defend them.204 If the Kaleys
were to be treated differently by the justice system from indigent defendants simply because they used to be wealthy, such treatment
would create a different standard based on current or prior economic
status.205 This unequal treatment could be considered a violation of
equal protection, and thus it could be held to be unconstitutional.206

198. Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1102 n.13 (quoting id. at 1111 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
199. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-158909, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SELECTED
FINDINGS:
INDIGENT
DEFENSE
1
(1996),
available
at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf.
200. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: FACT SHEET (2011),
available at http://ojp.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ojpfs_indigentdefense.html (explaining
the challenges and obstacles faced by local indigent defense systems).
201. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
202. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1956) (holding that a defendant
cannot be denied an appeal because he or she does not have the money to pay for a transcript of their trial and noting that “all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is
concerned, ‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.’”
(quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
203. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (“A
defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s money’ for legal
fees—even if that is the only way to hire a preferred lawyer.”).
204. See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1097 (2014) (noting that the Kaleys do
not dispute the proposition that with probable cause a freeze is valid).
205. See id. at 1096 (discussing how assets seized from a defendant pursuant to the forfeiture statute are no longer “rightfully his” (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at
618)(internal quotation marks omitted))).
206. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Provided the Kaleys’ appointed attorney meets the constitutional requirements of effectiveness laid out by Powell and Strickland,207 they
will have suffered no constitutional violation and therefore have no
constitutional right to a pretrial hearing to challenge the deprivation
of their assets; due process will have been satisfied.208
B. The Kaley Court Came to the Correct Holding but on Precarious
Grounds
The Kaley Court based the majority of its holding on the conclusiveness of the grand jury determination.209 The practical result of
this decision is that pretrial hearings held to contest the traceability of
assets seized are still required by due process, but a pretrial hearing
held solely to contest a grand jury’s finding of probable cause for the
underlying offense supporting the asset seizure is not.210 This contradiction is complicated by the Court’s including the Mathews balancing
test in its analysis but explicitly choosing not to rule on the test’s applicability to this case.211 If the Mathews framework is applied to this
issue, particularly when taking into consideration the harm that the
grand jury institution would sustain if such a hearing was permitted,
the Kaley holding does make more sense. The stability and significance of the Kaley holding, even once bolstered by the Mathews
framework, is weakened significantly by the considerable debate over
the importance of and deference to the grand jury institution, howev-

207. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that in a capital case, where
the defendant is unable to employ counsel and incapable of making his own defense, that
“it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law” and that this duty is not discharged unless the assigned counsel has given effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (explaining the test for effective counsel).
208. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due process imposes constraints on “governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or
‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Kaleys were not deprived of their interest in effective counsel,
and so no hearing is required. See id. at 333 (“This Court consistently has held that some
form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.”); see also Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1111 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the freezing of assets that would be used to fund attorney’s fees amounts to the deprivation of a
property interest).
209. Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1100 (majority opinion).
210. Id. at 1108 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the majority has not given any
reason to why a grand jury’s determinations as to traceability must be reconsidered but
probable cause may not be reconsidered).
211. Id. at 1100–04 (majority opinion) (conducting a Mathews analysis but declining to
comment on its applicability to the Kaleys’ case).
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er.212 It is this doubt that, even when integrating the Mathews analysis
into the Court’s reasoning, makes the Kaley holding less than satisfying.
1. The Practical Result of the Kaley Holding Is That a Traceability
Hearing Is Required by Due Process but a Probable Cause Hearing
Is Not
The Kaley Court did not extensively address the anomalous
treatment that the court system gives pretrial hearings contesting the
traceability of forfeited assets to the crime being tried, as compared to
pretrial hearings that challenge grand jury determinations of probable cause for the underlying charges authorizing those same seizures.213 It is currently undisputed among the circuit courts that due
process requires a pretrial hearing to challenge the traceability of assets frozen pursuant to the forfeiture statute.214 Not only is such a
hearing on this issue merely allowed, it is generally considered constitutionally required.215
The only explanation that the Court offers to account for why
traceability is subject to judicial review and probable cause is not, is
that tracing assets is “a technical matter far removed from the grand
jury’s core competence and traditional function.”216 This justification
fails to explain exactly how the “technical” nature of traceability
means that its review is required by due process but probable cause is
not.
It is possible that in citing the “technical” nature of traceability
the Kaley Court was alluding to the origins of criminal forfeiture,
which was first introduced in 1970 with the passage of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).217 Until the
RICO Act was passed, virtually no American legal precedent for the

212. See infra Part V.B.2.
213. See Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1095 (noting that the lower courts have “uniformly allowed”
a defendant to litigate traceability); see also id. at 1095 n.3 (noting that the Government
agreed that a defendant has a constitutional right to a hearing on traceability and declining to opine on the issue).
214. Id. at 1095.
215. See id. at 1108 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that a district court constitutionally must, if asked, review the grand jury’s findings as to traceability but may not do so as to
the underlying charged offenses); see also supra note 214.
216. Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1099 n.9 (majority opinion).
217. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968
(2012).
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forfeiture mechanism existed.218 The RICO Act was initially enacted
as a weapon against large-scale organized crime and drug trafficking.219 One of Congress’ objectives in enacting the legislation was to
separate and protect the legitimate businesses that had been infiltrated by organized crime; as a result, only those assets that are traceable
to, or the fruit of illegal activity, are forfeitable, rather than the entirety of the defendant’s property.220
Courts have debated over the precise definitions and quantifications of this traceability analysis, particularly in the pretrial context.221
In 2000, Congress approved Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which preserved a defendant’s right to contest traceability, provided that the government has established the “requisite
nexus between the property and the offense.”222 It is important to
note, however, that this right is not a constitutional one, but merely
one legislatively prescribed and which can be voluntarily waived.223
The criminal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. Section 853, defines the
property forfeitable as proceeds obtained “directly or indirectly” from
the violation and such property used to “facilitate the commission of”
the violation, and also includes a “rebuttable presumption” provision.224 Under this provision, the government must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the assets were acquired during the same period in which the violation in question occurred and
(2) that there is no likely source for the defendant to have gained this

218. Richard W. Mass, Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to Retain the
“Rolls Royce of Attorneys” with the “Fruits of the Crime”?, 39 STAN. L. REV. 663, 664–67 (1987)
(noting that “[c]riminal forfeiture was a typical punishment under English common law
for those who were convicted of treason or felony” but that “criminal forfeiture never
gained acceptance in the American colonies”).
219. Id. at 663–64. The same year that RICO was passed, Congress also passed the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which contained an almost identical forfeiture provision. Both provisions were enacted in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Id. at 665.
220. Id. at 666–67.
221. Stefan D. Cassella, Criminal Forfeiture Procedure: An Analysis of Developments in the Law
Regarding the Inclusion of a Forfeiture Judgment in the Sentence Imposed in a Criminal Case, 32
AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 67–69 (2004).
222. Id. at 73 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.(b)(1)(A)).
223. Cassella, supra note 221, at 95. Cassella examines the pre-American roots and recent case law concerning criminal forfeiture and ultimately concludes that the criminal
defendant’s right to a jury determination on forfeiture issues is merely a statutory right,
not a constitutional one. Id.; see Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (“Libretti
acknowledged in the agreement ‘that by pleading guilty to Count Six of the Indictment,
he waive[d] various constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial.”).
224. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), (d) (2012).
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property other than from the violation.225 If the government meets
this burden of proof at trial, then the assets are presumed to be forfeitable unless proven otherwise.226
In light of the history of the criminal forfeiture statute, the property rights at stake, and the nature of the analysis required, the due
process requirement of a pretrial hearing to contest traceability of
seized assets is logical. In order to reconcile why the Kaley Court held
that the probable cause pretrial hearing is not similarly required by
due process, it is helpful to turn to the Mathews analysis. In conducting the test, the Kaley Court considered the restraint on the defendants’ ability to retain the counsel of their choice.227 The Kaley Court
weighed this interest against the value to the government of forfeiture, as well as the costs and time consumed by a probable cause hearing, or “mini-trial.”228 Along with this cost, the Court included the potential exposure of the prosecution’s case.229 The Court considered
this harm in light of the second prong of the Mathews analysis, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures
used and the probable value of any procedural safeguards.230 The
Court concluded that any deprivation of the right to counsel of
choice would not be erroneous as a result of the Monsanto holding,
requiring only probable cause to commit the deprivation.231 In short,
the Kaley Court determined that the first two factors were a wash, but
that the third prong of the test, the government’s interest, including
the burden that the additional safeguard would entail, tipped the
scale against the Kaleys.232
This prong of the test in essence left the Court with two options:
hold that the grand jury determinations of probable cause can be
overturned by a judge at a subsequent probable cause hearing, and in
doing so, effectively render irrelevant an institution that has been a
part of the criminal justice system since its foundation, or alternatively
hold that due process does not require the probable cause hearing.
Placed between a rock and a hard place, colloquially speaking, the
Court’s decision to forestall the application of the Mathews test and

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. § 853(d).
Id.
Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1101 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 1103–04.
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instead base the holding on the grand jury’s unassailable role in the
system becomes less of a mystery.
2. The Deference Due to the Grand Jury Is Far from Settled Law
The Kaley Court based the majority of its holding on precedent
that recognizes the grand jury’s exclusive role in determining probable cause and prohibits challenges to the reliability or sufficiency of
the evidence supporting a grand jury’s finding of probable cause.233
The Court explained that as a practical matter, because a grand jury
indictment can effect a pretrial restraint on a person by restricting his
or her liberty in such a way that is conclusive until trial, it follows that
a higher standard is not constitutionally required for an individual’s
property.234 In short, the Court concluded that no matter how compelling an argument the Kaleys make, such a hearing cannot be required
because of “a fundamental and historic commitment of our criminal
justice system” to trust the grand jury to make such probable cause
determinations.235
The sanctity and vital nature of the role of the grand jury is not as
clear-cut as the Kaley Court makes it out to be, however. Scholars disagree on whether grand juries are a necessary, or even advantageous,
element of the criminal justice system.236 Most notably, the grand jury
has been accused of being an inadequate check on over-zealous prosecutions.237 The grand jury is designed to act as a screen, weeding out
charges that are not supported by adequate evidence, shielding individuals from malicious or unwarranted prosecutions.238 In fulfilling
this role, a grand jury is primarily responsible for hearing the prosecution’s side of the case, to determine if it has met its burden of
probable cause.239 The decision does not have to be unanimous, and
there are few limits on the types of evidence the jury can hear.240 The
prosecutor is also not required to inform the grand jury of any evidence that is favorable to the defendant.241 The result is an extremely
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1097.
See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 260, 262 (1995) (noting that “[t]his division of opinion is not only sharp,
but fundamental”).
237. Id. at 263. Leipold argues that “as currently constructed, grand juries not only do
not, but cannot, protect the accused from unfounded charges.” Id. at 264.
238. Id. at 262–63.
239. Id. at 265–66.
240. Id. at 266–67.
241. Id. at 267.
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high indictment rate; for example, in one study, a 99.6% success rate
was recorded.242 This has prompted many to allege that the grand jury is an ineffective screen, and famously, willing to “indict a ham
sandwich” if asked.243
The lack of restraints that are placed on the grand jury have
caused even the Supreme Court to comment that the body is a
“grand inquest” whose “scope of . . . inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety” or “by doubts whether any particular
individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.”244
These and other concerns relating to the grand jury as an institution
were even vocalized by the justices themselves during the Kaley oral
arguments. As Chief Justice Roberts noted, the grand jury, even
though in theory designed to protect individuals from unfounded
prosecutions, is “not great insulation from the overwe[e]ning power
of the government.”245
There is overwhelming evidence that the grand jury is not a perfect institution, and it is cases like the Kaleys’, which directly challenge the authority of an institution deeply entrenched within the history and values of our criminal justice system, that are particularly
difficult to resolve. Framing the issue in this context is a lose-lose situation—the Court cannot directly disregard or circumvent the role of
the grand jury in determining probable cause, but upholding the
grand jury’s determinations as unchallengeable leaves a lot of lingering uncertainty over fairness and government power. As Justice Scalia
said in response to Howard Srebnick, who argued on behalf of the
Kaleys that the grand jury is a one-sided presentation that does not
give the defendant an opportunity to be adequately heard, “[w]e’ve
been doing it for a thousand years, though, and it’s hard to say that it
violates what our concept of fundamental fairness is.”246
Justice Scalia’s point goes to the core of the problem: even
though we’ve been doing it this way for many years, longevity alone
does not mean the grand jury remains an effective screening tool in
an evolving criminal justice system, despite its original function.247
With criticism and doubt in the grand jury institution’s infallibility
242. Id. at 274.
243. In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stewart, 545 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1989).
244. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
245. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014)
(No. 12-464).
246. Id. at 9.
247. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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both widespread and considerably well-founded, it becomes increasingly clear that the Kaley Court has only opened the door for uncertainty and dispute by basing its holding on the finality of the grand jury. Instead, the Court should have looked to the lack of Fifth and
Sixth Amendment violations as grounds for the Kaley holding.
V. CONCLUSION
In Kaley v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Constitution does not give the defendants a right to a pretrial hearing
to relitigate a grand jury’s determination of probable cause to believe
that the defendants committed the crime charged.248 Although the
Kaley Court came to the correct holding, the Court erred in concluding that this issue hinged on the conclusiveness of a grand jury’s determination.249 The Court should have instead focused on the absence of such a hearing resulting in deprivation of the defendant’s
access to his or her counsel of choice, which does not amount to a
constitutional violation.250 To do otherwise would be to raise questions of efficiency, generate issues relating to equal protection, and
most importantly, create the potential for confusion and inconsistent
interpretations of the Kaley holding by the lower courts.

248. 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094, 1096 (2014).
249. See supra Part IV.B.
250. See supra Part IV.A.

